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ABSTRACT 
 
This article investigates perceptions of the extent to which NGO peer regulation initiatives 
have been effective in enhancing accountability in the humanitarian sector. It is based upon 
semi-structured interviews with individuals with responsibility for accountability policy from 
leading NGOs and focuses on two of the best-known initiatives: Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership and Sphere. It finds that the initiatives have prompted positive changes in 
practice, but there are significant concerns about their deleterious impacts. Participants 
describe a host of challenges, including the tendency of peer -regulation to become 
excessively bureaucratic and labor-intensive. They cast some doubt on the potential of the 
initiatives to assist NGOs to be more accountable to affected communities.  
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Accountability has become the leitmotif of debate about principles of good practice for  non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). It was once relatively easy for NGOs to escape scrutiny 
of their actions by sheltering behind the flattering caricature of being a ‘magic bullet’ for a 
host of societal ills (Edwards and Hulme, 1996). The push for enhanced accountability 
emerged in the wake of the Cold War, when Northern governments and international 
organizations increasingly turned to NGOs to provide emergency assistance in the Balkans 
and global South. These donors demanded greater financial transparency from NGOs and 
evidence that programs met their intended objectives (Crack, 2013a). The sector has also 
recently been rocked by a series of high-profile scandals, and unsympathetic media coverage 
(Gibelman & Gelman, 2001). A legacy of botched relief operations, from Rwanda to Haiti, 
has evoked concerns that NGOs could worsen the plight of vulnerable people who they aim 
to assist (The Lancet, 2010). NGOs are exposed as never before to allegations of corruption, 
incompetence and abuse of power.  
There is widespread agreement amongst practitioners, donors and academics that NGOs 
should strive to  provide assurance that they are ‘accountable’ actors (Groves & Hinton, 
2004; Jordan & van Tujl, 2007, Kilby, 2006).  It is commonly asserted that NGOs have 
multiple (and often conflicting) accountability relationships. These include ‘upwards 
accountability’ to governments and donors, ‘downwards accountability’ to affected 
communities and partners, ‘internal accountability’ to staff, and ‘peer accountability’ to the 
wider sector (Edwards and Hulme, 1996; Najam, 1996; Ebrahim, 2003; Crack, 2013b). Peer 
regulation initiatives
i
 are the most significant collective attempt to promote these ideals. Peer-
regulation is the process whereby a sector level organization promotes common standards of 
quality and accountability for NGOs. NGOs may volunteer to adhere to these standards, but 
they are not under any legal obligation. Peer-regulation ranges from aspirational codes of 
conduct, to certification initiatives with robust verification procedures (Lloyd & Casas, 
2005). Lloyd et al (2010) have identified over 350 peer regulation initiatives, which spans a 
range of NGO activities, such as service delivery, advocacy and fundraising. They were first 
established, and are most developed, in humanitarian work. This research focuses on the 
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and Sphere – two of the best-known 
initiatives for humanitarian NGOs that focus strongly on downwards accountability, and 
represent both ends of the regulatory spectrum.  
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Literature on the topic is scarce. There are some useful practitioner-oriented publications on 
peer-regulation, but not specific comparisons of HAP and Sphere (ibid; Hammand & Morton, 
2011; Featherstone, 2013). There has been some journal articles on the effectiveness of 
national and regional peer-regulation, but again, these do not focus on the sector-wide 
initiatives (Bies, 2010; Gugerty, 2008; Sidel, 2010). Some practitioners who were closely 
involved with early discussions about Sphere have published their reflections, but these are 
now rather outdated since they relate to earlier versions of the project (Darcy, 2004; Dufour 
et al, 2004; Gostelow, 1999; Tong, 2004). Most scholarly activity clusters around the reasons 
behind the emergence of peer-regulation, which can be crudely characterized as a debate 
between sociological institutionalists/constructivists (Kennedy, 2012; Deloffre, 2010) and 
adherents of principal-agent theory (e.g. Prakash and Gugerty, 2010). There is barely any 
academic literature that evaluates the  impact of HAP and Sphere policies. This is regrettable, 
given that representatives of HAP and Sphere have admitted that there is scant evidence of 
their impact in improving humanitarian assistance (ALNAP, 2012). This article aims to 
address that gap. It investigates perceptions of the extent to which HAP and Sphere have been 
effective in enhancing levels of accountability across the sector. It is based upon semi-
structured interviews with thirty-four individuals with responsibility for accountability policy 
from fourteen leading international humanitarian NGOs. Despite indications that these agents 
can be important policy entrepreneurs within NGOs and the wider sector, they have rarely 
been the subject of academic research.
ii
  
The article consists of four main sections. First, there is an outline of the main features of 
HAP and Sphere, and details of the methodology. Second, there is discussion of the perceived 
benefits of peer-regulation, which include providing an impetus for change and a signal of 
credibility to donors. Third, the numerous challenges of peer-regulation are examined, which 
are as follows: there has been an overwhelming proliferation of initiatives, observance of the 
standards can be excessively bureaucratic, the initiatives may not adequately accommodate 
the organizational diversity in the sector, and the extent to which the standards are sufficient 
to embed a culture of accountability to affected populations is doubtful. Finally, the 
conclusion offers some policy prescriptions, reflects on the strengths and limitations of the 
research, and provides recommendations for further research. 
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THE SPHERE PROJECT 
Sphere is undoubtedly the best-known regulatory initiative: the standards ‘have now entered 
into the lexicon of the aid community and the production of those standards has now entered 
into its folklore’ (Walker & Purdin, 2004: 100). Sphere proclaims it is ‘working for a world 
in which the right of all people affected by disasters to re-establish their lives and livelihoods 
is recognized and acted upon in ways that respect their voice and promote their dignity and 
security’ (Sphere, 2011)..It was launched in 1997 by the International Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Movement and a consortium of NGOs as an attempt to develop a code of conduct 
supported by technical guidance (Walker & Purdin, 2004: 101). In the initial stages, a 
working group was established to create a Charter to codify norms about humanitarian action. 
The Humanitarian Charter emphasized the centrality of the humanitarian imperative, and 
declared the fundamental rights of crisis-affected people to receive assistance and to live a 
life with dignity. It stressed the importance of accountability to affected communities, and 
their participation in consultations about the provision of assistance. Several committees were 
tasked with drafting Minimum Standards for emergency response: information about 
practical action in relief programs that could help to achieve the normative goals outlined in 
the Charter. The discussions drew upon the expertise of numerous NGOs and 
intergovernmental agencies such as the UNCHR, WHO and WFP. The finalized version of 
the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards was published in 2000 as the ‘Sphere 
Handbook’, containing information about best practice in emergency response, and was 
widely disseminated throughout the humanitarian community. The Handbook has since 
undergone two revisions based on exhaustive consultations with thousands of practitioners 
and hundreds of agencies. The 2011 printed edition stands at nearly 400 pages. It has sold 
tens of thousands of copies across the world, has been translated into 23 languages, and can 
also be accessed for free online.
iii
 Thus, there are firm grounds for Sphere to claim that it 
‘enjoys broad acceptance by the humanitarian sector as a whole’ (Sphere, 2011: 5).  
The Minimum Standards cover four areas of humanitarian assistance: water supply, sanitation 
and hygiene promotion; food security and nutrition; shelter, settlement and non-food items; 
and health action. The Standards are supported by lists of key indicators and guidance notes. 
For example, one of the Shelter and Settlement Standards states that people should have 
access to covered living space, that ensures ‘their privacy, safety and health and enabl[es] 
essential household and livelihood activities to be undertaken.’ (ibid: 258) One of the 
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suggested indicators for meeting this Standard is that all ‘affected individuals have an initial 
minimum covered floor area of 3.5m² per person’ (ibid.).  
NGOs can claim adherence to the Sphere Standards, but there is no formal system of 
accreditation or verification. Sphere has ‘consciously opted for the Handbook not to be 
prescriptive or compliance-oriented, in order to encourage the broadest possible ownership of 
the Handbook’ (ibid: 8). Numerous NGOs have incorporated Sphere Standards into their 
internal accountability frameworks, and designed their own systems of monitoring and 
evaluation to assess their practice. Institutional donors have also increasingly attached 
Sphere-related conditions to funds.  
Sphere has not been met with an uncritical reception. From the earliest stages, a group of 
French NGOs, led by Médicins Sans Frontières, expressed grave skepticism about the entire 
enterprise, since they argued that it reduced humanitarianism from an act of compassion and 
solidarity, to merely an act of technical assistance (Dufour et al, 2004; Terry, 2002). They 
questioned the wisdom of determining common standards for humanitarian operations, since 
crises occur in hugely diverse cultural, economic and environmental contexts. Moreover, they 
feared that donors would use Sphere as a tool to impose more restrictive conditions on NGOs, 
designed to improve cost-efficiency rather than respond to the most compelling human needs 
(ibid). Two key figures in the development of Sphere have admitted that it has been 
sometimes ‘hijacked and mugged’ by donors, and that it can ‘grossly fail to support the 
victims of war and disaster’ if it is narrowly interpreted as a set of technical guidelines 
(Walker & Purdin, 2004: 111). Nonetheless, they also point out that the ‘rights-based 
approach’ promoted by Sphere has been a significant influence on the conception and 
practice of humanitarian action since its inception (ibid: 110).  
 
HUMANITARIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PARTNERSHIP INTERNATIONAL 
(HAP) 
HAP is one of the few certification schemes in the humanitarian sector, with international 
reach. It is a multi-agency initiative that aims to enhance the quality of humanitarian 
programs and the accountability of member organizations to crisis-affected populations. 
Accountability is defined as: ‘the means through which power is used responsibly. It is a 
process of taking into account the views of, and being held accountable by, different 
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stakeholders, and primarily the people affected by authority and power’ (HAP, 2010: 1, 
original emphasis). HAP is designed to assist NGOs to be responsive to the needs of people 
and communities, and to reduce the potential for corruption and abuse. Although HAP is 
generally promoted as a tool for humanitarian accountability, the Standard states that the 
‘dividing line between humanitarian assistance and development assistance is fluid’, and the 
term ‘”humanitarian” should be interpreted broadly’ (HAP, 2010: 2).  In fact, ‘the HAP 
Standard can be applied to all aspects of an organization’s work, including relief, 
development and advocacy’ (ibid). 
The first HAP Board was elected in 2003, at a General Assembly of representatives and Chief 
Executives of several NGOs. The HAP Principles were issued thereafter, which acknowledge 
the primacy of the humanitarian imperative, and the norms of participation, transparency, and 
the rights of redress, amongst others. A two-year consultation followed in 2005 to assess the 
suitability of introducing evidence-based indicators to enable organizations to demonstrate 
their observance of the Principles. HAP subsequently evolved into a formal accreditation 
system. The first version of the HAP Standard in Accountability and Quality Management 
was published in 2007, and it was updated in 2010 following a stakeholder consultation of 
1,900 people in 56 countries, including ‘beneficiaries’ (ibid).  
The Standard consists of six benchmarks, relating to corporate commitments, staff 
competency, information-sharing, participation, complaints procedures and organizational 
learning. Each benchmark is supplemented by a detailed list of verifiable requirements. There 
are additional clauses for NGOs that do not directly deliver assistance, but supply financial, 
material or technical support to partner organizations. These organizations are required to 
undertake specific measures to verify that their partners are also meeting the Standard, 
although some allowances are made to reflect differences in capacity (HAP, 2010: 3). 
HAP awards certification to NGOs that are able to demonstrate accordance with the Standard 
through a rigorous independent audit. This includes scrutiny of internal documents, 
interviews with staff based at the headquarters and the field, interviews with partners and 
intended beneficiaries, and direct observation of practice. Certification expires after a three 
year period, during which time the NGO will undergo mid-term monitoring to verify 
continued adherence to the Standard. NGOs are supported in their efforts to improve their 
performance: HAP representatives are sent to the field to provide advice, there are training 
workshops, and a wealth of learning resources online. There is, however, a penalty for non-
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compliance. Complaints about the conduct of member organizations can be submitted to 
HAP’s Standing Complaints Committee, and if upheld, certification can be revoked.  
HAP has 91 member organizations, which include institutional donors as well as NGOs from 
across the world. Only 17 members have successfully completed the audit and are fully 
certified (HAP, 2014). As discussed below, some critics of HAP have alleged that there is 
insufficient evidence of its impact on standards of humanitarian accountability, but there are 
reasons to speculate that it has been widely perceived as beneficial. HAP conducted a recent 
survey of 756 members of the humanitarian community to collate views ‘about organizational 
practice, including the levels of participation by disaster-affected communities in 
performance assessments, and the extent to which organizations foster an environment in 
which communities feel they can raise complaints’ (HAP, 2012: 108). Respondents from 
HAP-certified NGOs gave the highest approval ratings for their organization’s performance 
in humanitarian accountability (78.5%), whilst respondents from NGOs unrelated to HAP 
gave the lowest ratings (36.6%; ibid: 114). It should be noted, however, that these findings 
reveal an interesting correlation between perceptions of good accountability and HAP 
membership, rather than assertions by the respondents of a direct causal link. The fact that 
HAP conducted the survey is also potentially problematic and highlights the need for 
independent assessment. 
 
Main Characteristics of Sphere and HAP  
 
Name of 
Initiative 
Type  of 
Regulation 
Compliance Usage 
Sphere 
Humanitarian 
Charter and 
Minimum 
Standards in 
Disaster 
Response 
Code of 
Conduct 
No system of verification or 
sanctions for non-compliance. 
No formal system of 
membership. Sphere is an 
open-access resource that 
any organization or aid-
worker can use for 
guidance. 
HAP Certification Certification granted for three 91 member organizations 
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2010 Standard 
in 
Accountability 
and Quality 
Management 
Scheme years, subject to an extensive 
audit and mid-term 
monitoring. Certification can 
be revoked if a complaint 
about a member’s conduct is 
upheld by the Standing 
Complaints Committee. 
from across the world, 
including 17 fully-
certified members. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Thirty-four participants with responsibility for accountability policy were selected from a 
sample of fourteen NGOs that bear similarities in terms of the global reach of their programs, 
annual turnover and association with HAP and/or Sphere. These individuals represent an 
expert community that has emerged to manage the increasing demands on NGOs to 
demonstrate accountability. They have been intimately involved in important shifts in the 
understanding and practice of accountability, and they have unique experiences of the 
challenges of implementing peer regulation initiatives. In the words of one interviewee: 
‘…you get a good sense of what’s going on in the sector by looking at the jobs market. And 
in the last five years, these Accountability Managers have been popping up left, right and 
centre. Accountability Advisers, Accountability Managers, Heads of Accountability. And 
now a lot of the organizations are recruiting Heads of M&E. Heads of Planning, Monitoring 
and Evaluation. Heads of Research and Evaluation. I think that’s where they’re seeing the 
real challenge’ (Int.5).iv 
These job titles match or closely correlate with the roles of the research participants. Semi-
structured interviews were conducted between November 2011 and March 2013. Participants 
were asked to comment on the effectiveness of peer-regulation based on their professional 
experience and awareness of trends in the wider sector. The paper primarily focuses on their 
responses with regard to HAP and Sphere. The research was supplemented with interviews 
with individuals from NGO membership bodies, independent consultants with expertise in 
NGO accountability, and document analysis. Some quotes in this report are directly attributed 
to named persons with their consent. Most participants requested that their identity remain 
confidential. The anonymous quotes have been framed in a generic way where it is felt that it 
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would be helpful to place the comment into context (e.g. ‘a staffer from a HAP-certified 
NGO stated that…’). All such references have been approved by the relevant interviewee.  
The interview data was coded by hand. What follows is a summary of the key themes, 
divided into two main sections: the benefits afforded by peer-regulation, and the associated 
challenges. Most of the commentary relates to the latter, which reflects the disproportionate 
focus of most of the interviewees’ responses. 
  
PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF PEER-REGULATION 
Catalyst for change 
HAP and Sphere were forged by an extensive consultative process, which has helped to 
bestow legitimacy on the initiatives. They represent the distillation of a rich body of expertise 
in humanitarianism. There was almost unanimous agreement that one of the greatest benefits 
of peer-regulation is that it generates intra-organizational momentum for change. Participants 
find the initiatives extremely valuable in raising the profile of accountability issues amongst 
their fellow staff-members. The wide recognition of the initiatives helps to validate their 
efforts to promote new ways of conceiving accountability. Further, the participants found that 
Sphere or HAP were particularly effective levers for reform once their organization had 
pledged to abide by the standards. A rhetorical commitment to the initiatives helps to 
energize discussions about how they can be translated from abstract principles to operational 
reality. It helps to shape perceptions of the level of service that affected communities are 
entitled to expect and can instigate meaningful changes in practice. All of the NGOs had 
internal accountability frameworks that had been shaped to some extent by norms associated 
with peer-regulation, which attests to the success of the initiatives in setting the policy 
agenda. Indeed, several participants identified concrete examples of reform that could be 
directly attributed to the influence of HAP and/or Sphere; including Oxfam’s establishment 
of complaints mechanisms and an open information policy, and Merlin’s introduction of a 
protection policy for vulnerable individuals. There was consensus that one of the most 
valuable benefits of peer-regulation are the diverse learning opportunities; including training 
workshops, tools for policy gap analysis, case study materials, discussion forums and 
informal networking. Both HAP and Sphere were applauded in this respect, and one 
interviewee observed in terms of the former: ‘the conversations that I’ve had with a number 
of people whose organizations have been involved in the certification process, the 
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certification aspect of HAP is for a lot of people…secondary to the kind of identification and 
sharing of good practice that HAP has done’ (Int.5). The remark alludes to an undercurrent of 
cynicism about certification, which is discussed in more detail below. 
 
Signal of credibility 
Participants admitted that one of the main motivations for observing peer regulation 
initiatives is to enhance donor confidence that funds will be spent wisely. Moreover, NGOs 
are more likely to become involved when peer organizations proclaim adherence to the 
initiatives, for fear that otherwise they would be in a disadvantageous position in the 
competition for funds. Both HAP and Sphere promise reputational advantages to NGOs, but 
participants conceded that HAP is the most highly regarded because of its stringent 
requirements for certification. HAP’s endorsement is seen as one of the most powerful 
signals of an organization’s credibility both within and outside the sector. The terms ‘brand 
recognition’ and ‘kite-mark’ were used by some participants to describe the attractions of 
HAP membership, which suggests that NGOs have emulated the corporate sector in 
advertising their accountability credentials, as the following quote reveals: 
‘HAP also comes with a bit of a PR slant to it, so it enables us…to sell ourselves….That 
brand bit is actually massively influential, I think, and I certainly know from [our 
organization’s] position and the views of our Chief Executive – the moral argument to be 
accountable is clear and, you know, we’re fully behind it, but in HAP the reason that we are 
going for certification is for the recognition of the work that we’re doing.’ (Int.21) 
 
PERCEIVED CHALLENGES OF PEER-REGULATION 
Bound in a web of regulation 
HAP and Sphere are embedded in a complex and diverse regulatory terrain that NGOs have 
to navigate to access funding. It is not possible to fully appreciate the challenges associated 
with HAP and Sphere without understanding how the diverse demands of this multifaceted 
regulatory regime intensify pressures to demonstrate compliance with sector-wide norms. 
Practically all of the participants expressed concerns over the recent proliferation of 
regulatory initiatives, which one person described in pejorative terms as ‘an industry of 
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standard-setting’ (Int.2). Participants complained of being overwhelmed with trying to meet 
the reporting requirements and keep abreast of the latest developments; and several described 
a wearying feeling that: ‘there always seems to be a new initiative popping up’ (Int.20). An 
interviewee from Oxfam explained that field-workers ‘feel that there are too many of these 
initiatives – that’s feedback that we get quite often, and they’re saying, well should we be 
doing HAP, should we be doing this, should we be doing that’ (Int.4).  
It is hard to promote the accountability agenda in a climate where practitioners feel inundated 
with standards and guidelines, since they may become disengaged, and inclined to dismiss 
attempts at organizational reform as ‘just another new initiative, rather than an integral part to 
what they should already be doing’ (Int.7). The risk is that peer-regulation is perceived as a 
confusing and burdensome policy fad. A former board-member of Sphere recognized that 
these reactions were commonplace and understandable given that: ‘they’d be lucky to get a 
half-hour briefing on quality and accountability generally before being sent out to the 
field…they are beyond saturation point in terms of standards and principles and commitments 
and frameworks’ (Int.31). The delivery of comprehensive training programs is logistically 
challenging when emergencies require rapid deployment to the field, and it is also a resource-
intensive proposition given increasingly mobile workforces. 
The scope of different regulatory initiatives can overlap, which exacerbates the confusion. 
Indeed, a representative from HAP acknowledged during a General Assembly of member 
organizations that: ‘[m]any of us have been asked what is the difference between [HAP and 
Sphere] and there is no clear answer to this’ (HAP, 2008: 12). The accountability 
requirements relating to both initiatives also overlap with other peer regulation schemes, 
which means that basic information about performance and impact is often recycled to fit 
various reporting formats. Moreover, donors frequently tie their funding streams to 
accountability benchmarks of their own design, meaning that information has to be mined 
from peer regulation reports rephrased to meet the donor’s preferred format. This duplication 
of effort was roundly criticized by interviewees as inefficient and wasteful.  
Participants suggested that accountability priorities of NGOs tend to be biased towards 
donors, rather than affected populations. This can be directly detrimental to the ability of 
NGOs to adhere to their missions: ‘Field-staff almost have to choose are they going to write 
reports to donors and fill out a log-frame…or are they going to go and listen and respond to 
what poor people are saying’ (Int.6). A staffer suggested that donor insistence on the use of 
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their own accountability criteria revealed that: ‘donors…do not [want] to encourage us to 
formulate around single areas, or single ideas or single standards, because that in some way 
would compromise their own control. DFID is a classic example of this…massively 
supportive of HAP and Sphere and all those kinds of things – but don’t put their money 
where their mouth is, but also want to set up their own systems for checking that we are 
accountable’ (Int.21). A senior figure from World Vision called for ‘a much more 
sophisticated, more profound, more respectful dialogue with donors’ (Int.8) to explain the 
implications for overheads on preparing several unique reports, a largely unproductive 
exercise if it revises information already in the public domain. It adds a further layer of 
complexity to the NGO regulatory environment that aims to satisfy donor preferences, rather 
than the needs of affected populations. It is difficult, however, to initiate honest conversations 
with donors in a highly competitive environment for funding, which places pressure on 
NGOs to publicize their (occasionally embroidered) accounts of successful impacts. As Alex 
Jacobs, the Director of Programming and Effectiveness at Plan International, observes: ‘in 
organizations, you only really get change when you get survival anxiety. NGOs…survival 
anxiety is around keeping the donors happy, and so senior managers’ attention has to be 
focused on that.’ The Director of the Consortium of British Humanitarian Agencies, Sean 
Lowrie, also identified the financial dependence of NGOs on powerful stakeholders as a 
fundamental problem. Reflecting on his extensive professional experience, he argued that that 
donor influence poses severe limitations on the potential to deliver radical reform: ‘the only 
way to redress the power imbalance is to change the business model, to change the political 
economy. So I would argue that NGOs, being independent organizations, could probably 
reinvest the money from quality and accountability initiatives into acquiring independent 
funding without strings…because without that, they can’t respond to local influence.’  
 
Bureaucratic overload 
The combined pressures of donor accountability and peer-regulation place significant 
demands on human resources. Nearly all of the participants expressed fears that staff 
attention, which could be spent on endeavors that could arguably contribute more 
meaningfully to accountability, is instead spent on the time-consuming task of documenting 
performance. They did not object to formal reporting procedures per se; rather, they were 
concerned that excessively bureaucratic procedures limit the extent to which accountability 
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mechanisms can assist the organization in developing meaningful relationships with affected 
communities. In a highly-pressurized and resource-constrained environment, onerous 
reporting procedures can be regarded as a maddeningly tedious ritual; in the words of another 
interviewee, ‘just another thing to fill in’ (Int.2). These qualms were most often linked to 
HAP, with its strong focus on compliance and verification. The challenge, explained by a 
participant from a HAP-certified organization, is striking an appropriate balance: ‘I know we 
have to do reporting and we’ve got the auditors coming in and we’ve got all these other 
things, but for me I want to make sure…that the priority is actually delivering the work rather 
than just reporting on it’ (Int.28). Likewise, an Oxfam staffer cautioned that: ‘…it does risk 
turning into a paper trail auditing exercise and the actual principles of listening to the people 
you’re seeking to serve can get a little bit lost’ (Int.26). 
The drain on staff time may not be immediately apparent. Although there was consensus that 
peer-regulation provided valuable opportunities for networking and sharing of best practice, 
several suggested that opportunity costs should be factored into the amount of time that has to 
be spent serving on working groups, attending meetings and developing learning resources.  
Given that peer-regulation can be a labor-intensive commitment, several of the interviewees 
expressed disappointment that the claims made in favor of the initiatives have not been 
clearly substantiated with evidence of positive impact.  Two participants related that the cost 
associated with implementing policies in accordance with the initiatives had increased 
internal pressure on them to justify the expenditure by identifying the concrete benefits that 
accrue from membership. This challenge cannot be underestimated given that the 
representatives of HAP and Sphere have admitted that data on the impact of the initiatives is 
scarce (ALNAP, 2012). A senior NGO adviser voiced his frustrations about a recent meeting 
that he had attended where HAP and Sphere representatives acknowledged that they had:  
‘…no evidence of the impact of these things…So what’s the justification for allocating 
funding for accountability purposes? What is the business case for that?...That Sphere and 
HAP are standing up…and saying that we don’t know – we don’t have any evidence in terms 
of impact – that’s shocking actually’ (Int.12). 
Ironically, the initiatives have yet to provide the levels of accountability that are regularly 
demanded from NGOs. HAP and Sphere have not been in a position to provide a level of  
information about their impact that some respondents feel would be sufficient to evaluate the 
effectiveness of peer-regulation. John Damerell, the Project Manager from Sphere has 
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claimed that although ‘[w]e’re unable to determine directly if Sphere has had an impact in 
improving humanitarian work…there is a widespread perception that it has had a beneficial 
effect’ (ALNAP, 2012: 79). Likewise, Smruti Patel of HAP has acknowledged that ‘[w]e do 
need to be more rigorous in evidence-gathering’ but that ‘anecdotal evidence suggests HAP 
standards are making a difference’ (ibid: 82; also see Blagescu, 2010: 3). Practically all 
interviewees expressed similar sentiments. 
 
 Organizational diversity 
Most of the leading international NGOs have a federal system of governance, where member 
organizations in different countries enjoy varying degrees of autonomy under the same 
institutional ‘umbrella’. Participants in such NGOs explained that issues of organizational 
structure could be significant barriers to full engagement with peer regulation initiatives. In 
the words of a participant from ActionAid: ‘one of the challenges that we find in terms of 
compliance with some of these peer regulation mechanisms is that it by default assumes that 
there’s that kind of traditional hub and spoke model and that it’s quite easy to then 
demonstrate accountability because you’ve got common and consistent systems and 
approaches and ways of delivering’ (Int.20). Federal NGOs are afflicted with problems of 
synchronization in all spheres of operation. The headquarters or international secretariat can 
have limited information or control over the conduct of member organizations, meaning that 
it is extraordinarily difficult to coordinate accountability policy, much less monitor 
performance. A participant from a centralized organization described the tasks associated 
with HAP membership in favorable terms, in comparison with the experience of counterparts 
in federal NGOs. Despite the fact that the latter tend to have more resources at their disposal:  
‘…because of their huge size and scale, the assurance over maintaining that certification must 
be an absolute nightmare for them, I don’t know how they do it…And speaking to the likes of 
[three leading federal NGOs] who have that kind of family of organizations, I know that one 
of the things that they struggle with is… agreeing across all of them to have a global 
approach is really lengthy and difficult. And obviously there are politics between the family 
members as well, and it gets very complicated, so in some ways I’m quite pleased that I work 
for a single-entity organization, it’s much easier…it’s actually quite an easy organization to 
influence’ (Int.21).  
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It is relatively simpler for NGOs with a centralized system of governance to collate 
information about accountability performance for reports to donors and to peer regulators, 
because they have greater organizational cohesion. Participants who had past experience with 
centralized organizations, and who were currently employed by federal NGOs, also 
confirmed that they had previously found it easier to focus the minds of their colleagues on 
policy changes, and to implement accountability consistently.  
Participants from NGOs that work exclusively through partners remarked that HAP 
benchmarks were not always appropriately tailored to their needs, as illustrated by the 
following excerpt: ‘HAP was expecting us to work with all of our partners on accountability 
and training all of our partners. But we have about 500 and this is just not going to be 
possible…we’ve said, no, that’s never going to happen…in some respects I think the 
approach is more suited for operational agencies rather than those that work through partners’ 
(Int.28). HAP has been useful in promoting a vision of accountability from the standpoint of 
affected communities, but the reality is that NGOs ‘cannot force a partner to work that way’ 
(Int.20). Fruitful partnership is felt to rest upon principles of respect and mutual learning, 
which might be jeopardized by heavy-handed insistence upon observance of the finer details 
of HAP (quite apart from the obvious logistical difficulties in rolling out a training program 
and monitoring compliance across miscellaneous organizations). A participant in an 
organization with a large partner network noted that awkward predicaments could arise when 
partners had little appreciation of accountability norms: ‘a lot of the countries where we 
operate have very hierarchical culture…If you’re a West African middle class man, the idea 
that you actually listen and care about what a peasant farming woman has to say to you is a 
bit of a shift in attitude’ (Int.26). Nonetheless, the interviews yielded other anecdotes that 
underlined that partners can ‘be more accountable and not HAP-certified’ (Int.30) in terms of 
maintaining a close and long-term relationship with the local community. Partners can be 
more appreciative of customs and culture, and have a greater awareness of their needs and 
preferences through engaging in continual dialogue with community members. It is 
important, then, to ‘avoid locking [peer-regulation] into some Geneva-based ivory tower, 
rather than a more inclusive outreach to Southern society’ (Int.26). 
In sum, the management challenges faced by organizations in the sector are very diverse, and 
there is a feeling that peer regulation initiatives should be flexible enough to accommodate 
this organizational complexity. The participants believe that it is vital to explain to donors 
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that expectations about accountability should be tailored according to what is feasible for 
NGOs to deliver. 
 
Embedding a culture of accountability 
Interviewees that were supportive of certification schemes doubted whether a profound 
cultural shift in accountability could be achieved if peer regulation initiatives symbolized 
nothing more than a paper commitment. HAP’s bid for legitimacy largely rests upon 
monitoring the activities of its member organizations and imposing penalties for non-
compliance. It was widely acknowledged that donors were inclined to consider HAP as a 
credible signal of an organization’s integrity because of its robust verification procedures. 
Some interviewees with experience of HAP believed the potential of increasing the 
organization’s attractiveness to donors helped to motivate staff to take the accountability 
agenda seriously. Some related how the pressures of collating evidence of good practice in 
time for an audit had galvanized people into speeding up a process of reform that may have 
otherwise stagnated.  
However, most participants had misgivings about HAP’s compliance-based model, which 
could risk fostering a technocratic, ‘tick-box’ mentality towards accountability. These views 
were expressed by participants with and without direct experience of HAP certification. They 
suggested that it can raise anxiety amongst practitioners about the documentation of impact 
and performance, and dilute attention from the lived realities of affected populations. An 
example is HAP’s promotion of feedback procedures, such as complaints boxes and notice-
boards, which enable communities to voice their dissatisfaction about the poor performance 
of NGOs. Although hailed by some as a watershed in NGO accountability, a skeptical 
participant noted that such mechanisms can be used in an instrumental manner in the context 
of an accountability culture excessively focused on reports:  
‘I believe that you can be accountable without having a complaints mechanism – and if you 
have a complaints mechanism, it doesn’t mean that you’re accountable. But because we can 
measure whether we have a complaints mechanism or not, because we can employ staff to 
run the complaints mechanism, because we can quantify it in large proposals – we do it’ 
(Int.30). 
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The danger of HAP’s model of accountability, founded on routine verification, is that it may 
have the unintended consequence of tempting its members to pursue tokenistic policies that 
can be portrayed in written reports as examples of good practice.  
Furthermore, there was some hostility towards the implicit threat of sanctions (such as the 
withdrawal of certification for non-compliance), which was seen as deleterious to efforts to 
foster a culture of openness. In the words of one participant: ‘I think the danger with that is 
that you’ll talk up your work and you won’t be honest about the things that actually go 
wrong’ (Int.22). Another participant admitted that learning was undermined across the sector 
because ‘we’re kind of terrified of fuelling bad publicity which will directly affect our 
income’ (Int.6). Beris Gwynne, Director for Global Accountability at World Vision, agreed 
that: ‘donors, whether they are private or government, have very little tolerance for being told 
that somebody has made a mistake.’ The potential loss of certification, and the adverse 
attention that such a penalty would be likely to attract, could be a powerful disincentive to 
disclosure. Transparency, however, is essential to organizational learning, and improvement 
in performance is unlikely to be achieved if organizations feel inhibited from discussing their 
shortcomings. A staffer identified this issue as one of the most frustrating aspects of the job: 
‘I want more bad news stories, because agencies never share when they’re getting stuff 
wrong’ (Int.28). 
Nearly all of the participants argued that peer-regulation was not sufficient to inculcate higher 
standards of accountability. There needs to be a fundamental attitudinal shift at all levels of 
the organization regarding the nature of their responsibilities towards the people that they 
seek to represent and serve. According to a senior figure at Oxfam: ‘The problem is we’re 
stuffed full of people who want to do good, and because they want to do good assume that 
they are doing good’ (Int.26). Nonetheless, recent examples of NGO behavior in crisis 
situations may indicate that the accountability norms have not been fully internalized by key 
agents within leading organizations. Nick Guttman, the Head of the Humanitarian Division in 
UK-based Christian Aid, described the exclusion of local people from the Haitian relief effort 
as an illustrative example:  
‘…a cursory comment, a chat to someone who puts themselves forward and perhaps a local 
person invited to a meeting and that’s often seen as accountability. So many organizations 
talk the talk about accountability and including local people in decisions that affect them.  
But in Haiti local people were not part of the decision-making process despite all the talk.  
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Much of this comes down to individual and organizational attitudes not to the agreed 
principles and standards that they are signed up to. These attitudes, sometime probably from 
organizations certified by HAP – result in the agreed principles and standards about local 
accountability and inclusion being thrown out of the window when it comes down to the new 
high-profile, high-intensity emergencies. Because it’s not ingrained, it’s not part and parcel of 
the culture, it’s not part of the psyche.’  
Some participants described a certain air of arrogance that persists in some parts of the 
humanitarian sector; an attitude of ‘we know best’ and a sense of impatience at having to 
perform the ritual of community consultation when the best or most feasible way to deliver 
programs seems obvious. A participant argued: ‘it’s certainly not conscious, it certainly not a 
conscious effort to exert power over the poorest in the world. It’s just a cascade of well-
intentions’ (Int.30).  
Peer regulation initiatives can be thought of as a weathervane that indicates the changing 
direction of debate in the sector about accountability norms. The debate will remain relatively 
superficial until the norms permeate the organizational culture, become embedded in daily 
practice and are fully absorbed by those that manage and deliver humanitarian aid. Staff 
should therefore be encouraged to reflect upon their motivations for engaging in humanitarian 
work, and the nature of the relationships that they forge with partners and communities.. 
Most participants stressed the importance of strong leadership on accountability from a senior 
level. Equally, they acknowledged that field-staff should attach real value to efforts to 
involve communities at each stage of the design, implementation and evaluation of 
humanitarian assistance. A former chair of Sphere had modest expectations about the 
potential of peer regulation initiatives to promote such a profound transformation: 
‘I have come to the conclusion that accountability to beneficiaries can’t become, and mustn’t 
become, a hard bureaucratic requirement. Because then you lose the essence and the meaning 
and the humanity that is about accountability to beneficiaries….I think it needs individuals to 
make it happen. And individuals will make it happen when they realize that it’s 
fundamentally important, from a rights, from a human dignity, from a humanity perspective.’ 
(Int.31) 
 
CONCLUSION 
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This research has yielded some candid insights from key informants into the various impacts 
of peer-regulation on humanitarian action. Several broad themes are apparent from the 
interview data. It is evident that participants value the contribution of HAP and Sphere in 
setting a common agenda on accountability, and providing momentum for change. The 
initiatives have helped to diffuse norms about the rights of affected populations to live a life 
with dignity, and to be consulted about the provision of assistance. Peer-regulation has 
strengthened networks between NGOs and facilitated the sharing of organizational learning. 
Participants also acknowledged that the initiatives can help assure donors of the integrity of 
their organizations. HAP membership is a particularly useful tool to showcase the 
accountability credentials of a NGO. 
The benefits of peer-regulation are counterbalanced by a rather daunting list of challenges. 
There are serious concerns about the workload that the initiatives can entail, particularly in 
the context of donors that insist upon receiving separate reports tailored for their purposes. 
Several participants were alarmed about the increasing bureaucratization of HAP, and felt 
that an excessively technocratic approach to accountability could be counterproductive to the 
broader mission of being responsive to affected communities. Further, participants 
complained that standards should not be expected to apply equally to organizations with 
radically different structures and working practices. NGOs face complex challenges in 
promoting accountability, depending on whether they are centralized organizations, have a 
federal structure, and/or work with partners. It was suggested that HAP’s verification and 
compliance criteria are rather too rigid to accommodate this organizational diversity. Finally, 
participants reflected that deep-rooted cultural change is necessary across the sector before 
the vision of humanitarian accountability promoted by HAP and Sphere can become reality.  
Significant changes in peer-regulation are underfoot. Discussions are underway to integrate 
HAP with another peer regulation scheme that focuses on human resources: People in Aid. 
The ‘Core Humanitarian Standard’ (CHS) aims to bring ‘greater coherence to standards in the 
humanitarian sector’ (CHS, 2014), which might go some way to addressing the participants’ 
concerns about regulatory overlap. The proponents of CHS have conducted a wide survey of 
stakeholders about the efficacy of peer-regulation to determine the shape of the new 
initiative. The following policy suggestions are based on  the interview data and ventured as a 
contribution to the ongoing discussions:  
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 The sector should find collective ways of engaging in honest dialogue with donors 
about the impact for overheads of preparing unique reports, in addition to peer-
regulation commitments. A collective effort would minimize the possibility that 
individual organizations would be ‘punished’ by donors for objecting to their 
accountability demands. 
 Creative thinking is needed about the different ways that accountability can be 
demonstrated, other than through paper documentation. New media could be further 
exploited (e.g. capturing examples of good practice through mobile-phone footage, 
SMS, and Facebook posts, as long as privacy/ethical concerns are respected). It is 
inevitable that compliance-based initiatives such as HAP will involve significant 
paperwork, but the reflex bias towards detailed written evidence should be challenged 
wherever feasible. 
 HAP standards should be interpreted and applied in a more flexible way; customized 
for organizations that grapple with complex challenges in coordinating accountability 
policy. Nonetheless, it is HAP’s role to push reluctant organizations to achieve better 
standards of performance. The plea of mitigating circumstances by some NGOs may 
disguise institutional inertia and hostility towards change. It would be helpful for 
representatives from counterpart NGOs to assess one another’s performance as part of 
the review process, in order to filter out genuine difficulties from complaints borne 
out of recalcitrance. 
 There is no panacea for radical attitudinal shifts towards accountability. Cultural 
changes take time. The trajectory to meaningful reform can be maintained by 
organizations if individuals are recruited who can demonstrate an appreciation of a 
rights-based approach to accountability.  
The main limitation of this research is the small sample of participants. Expert perceptions 
may not accord with the views of field-workers and affected communities. It is noteworthy 
that the findings mainly focus on the management and administrative challenges of peer-
regulation, rather than the lived experiences of affected populations. This is not to suggest 
that the insights of the participants are less valuable than those ‘on the ground’, or to deny 
that management difficulties can ripple out to the field. It is simply to observe that the 
participants’ assessments of the extent to which HAP and Sphere have proved ‘effective’ are 
molded by their situatedness in the elite tier of the organization. Moreover, the participants 
were able to say little about the experiences of small NGOs. There is evidence to suggest that 
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small organizations harbor concerns that peer regulation initiatives reflect the preferences of 
their larger counterparts, and that they find adherence to the standards excessively onerous 
(Hammand & Morton, 2011: 16). A more holistic view of the impact of peer-regulation 
would require complementary studies with a range of different stakeholders, including with 
representatives of HAP and Sphere. As noted by the participants themselves, such evidence 
of impact is unfortunately sorely lacking. 
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i
 These are variously referred to as self-regulatory initiatives, or quality and accountability initiatives. My use of 
the term ‘peer-regulation’ draws upon Crack (2013a). 
ii
 An important exception is Kennedy (2012) who interviewed 60 key informants in an excellent sociological 
institutional analysis of HAP, Sphere and the Code of Conduct on Images and Messages. 
iii
 Available at: http://www.spherehandbook.org/ 
iv
 ‘Int’ is an abbreviation of ‘interview’. 
